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ABSTRACT 
IF OR WHEN? UNCERTAINY’S ROLE IN ANXIOUS ANTICIPATION 
by 
Kenneth Bennett 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Christine L. Larson 
 
 
 Uncertainty is often associated with subjective distress and a potentiated anxiety 
response. Occurrence uncertainty (OU), or the inability to predict if a threat will occur, has never 
been compared experimentally with temporal uncertainty (TU), or the inability to predict when a 
threat will occur. The current study aimed to 1) directly compare the eye-blink startle 
responsivity of OU and TU, 2) develop a more effective task for isolating uncertain anticipation, 
and 3) better understand the relationship between individual differences in the intolerance of 
uncertainty and uncertain anticipation startle responsivity. The novel study showed that OU 
anticipation is more anxiety provoking than certain threat, but TU anticipation is superior at 
eliciting anxiety overall. This suggests that in the context of uncertainty, there must be some 
level of certainty or threat proximity to elicit a robust anxiety response. Individual difference in 
the intolerance of uncertainty were not related to anticipatory startle responsivity. 
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If or When? Uncertainty’s Role in Anxious Anticipation 
Uncertainty is the inability to determine a situation’s outcome or to predict the valence, 
intensity, occurrence, or type of future stimulus (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Typically, 
anticipating uncertain potential threat and adjusting cognitively (e.g., planning out a means of 
response) and physiologically (e.g., fight or flight response) can be beneficial for the individual, 
especially when the threat is imminent and likely to occur (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). In contrast, 
extreme anxiety is thought to be developed and maintained by excessive anticipatory processes 
in the face of uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). For example, panic attacks that occur 
unpredictably tend to substantially increase worry about if and when a panic attack will occur, 
leading to chronic anxious apprehension (Craske, Glover, & DeCola, 1995). The tendency of 
anxious individuals to maladaptively anticipate uncertain threat or negative outcomes has 
received substantial attention, with mounting evidence suggesting that uncertainty is associated 
with heightened physiological reactivity and increased recruitment of brain regions that support 
the expression of arousal and negative affect, such as fronto-limbic circuits (Grillon, Baas, 
Lissek, Smith, & Milstein, 2004; Grillon et al., 2006; Grillon et al., 2008; Grupe & Nitschke, 
2013; Nelson & Shankman, 2011; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010; Shankman et al., 2014; Williams et 
al., 2014). 
One of the most common paradigms used to measure response to uncertainty is the NPU 
task, which compares threat/fear responses in temporally predictable threat (P), temporally 
unpredictable threat (U) and no threat (N) conditions (Grillon et al., 2004). Typically, the 
defensive startle blink response is enhanced during the unpredictable conditions, labeled anxiety-
potentiated startle, and during the predictable threat conditions, known as fear-potentiated startle 
(Schmitz & Grillon, 2012). Results from studies examining the response to uncertain threat in 
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non-anxious subjects using the NPU paradigm have revealed an increase in startle response when 
the aversive event was temporally uncertain compared to when the aversive event was certain 
and to safe conditions. The NPU paradigm has also effectively identified heightened response to 
uncertainty in various anxiety-related disorders, including panic disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and childhood anxiety disorders (Grillon et al., 2008; 
Grillon et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2014). Thus, the NPU paradigm appears to be a useful tool 
for measuring response to uncertainty in both anxious and non-anxious populations, with recent 
evidence indicating that the NPU task has good psychometric properties (Kaye, Bradford, & 
Curtin, 2016). 
Although there has been a significant amount of research examining uncertainty, there is 
still a need to better characterize the various types of uncertainty.  The majority of studies that 
have measured uncertainty with a task manipulation, such as the NPU task, have manipulated 
temporal uncertainty (TU), or the inability to predict when an aversive stimulus will occur 
(Grillon et al., 2004; Grillon, 2008; Grillon et al., 2008; Grillon et al., 2009; Lissek et al., 2005; 
Nelson & Shankman, 2011; Shankman, Robison-Andrew, Nelson, Altman, & Campbell, 2011). 
In contrast, relatively little is known about other aspects of uncertain threat, such as uncertainty 
regarding the intensity or likelihood of the threat occurring. A handful of studies have 
experimentally manipulated the intensity and frequency of threat (Bradford, Magruder, 
Korhumel, & Curtin, 2014; Chin, Nelson, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2015; Shankman et al., 2011). 
Shankman and colleagues (2011) found that temporal uncertainty produced significantly larger 
startle responses than conditions in which the intensity of the aversive stimulus was uncertain, 
highlighting the affective impact of temporally uncertain threat. Focusing on the uncertainty of 
the frequency or likelihood of the aversive stimulus, Chin and colleagues (2015) found greater 
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startle magnitudes during high (75%) reinforcement or more certain, compared to low (50%) 
reinforcement conditions in an associative learning study designed to assess response to 
uncertainty. However, self-reported intolerance of uncertainty was positively correlated with 
increased startle blink magnitudes only during the 50% reinforcement, or more uncertain 
condition. The type of uncertainty elicited by this condition is not knowing if a threat will occur, 
suggesting that individuals who are less tolerant of uncertainty become more anxious when the 
occurrence of the potential threat is less certain.  
The findings from Chin and colleagues (2015) highlight the possible relevance of 
occurrence uncertainty (OU), the inability to determine if (i.e., the likelihood) an aversive 
stimulus will occur, for eliciting anxious states (Bradford et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2015; 
Dunsmoor, Bandettini, & Knight, 2007; Dunsmoor, Bandettini, & Knight, 2008; Hsu, Bhatt, 
Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Williams et al., 2014). Occurrence uncertainty has been 
rarely studied in humans; therefore, it is unclear the state of anticipatory anxiety this type of 
uncertainty elicits, nor what role it plays in the development of chronic and clinical anxiety 
(Fujii, Uchida, & Imada, 1994; Marlin, Sullivan, Berk, & Miller, 1979). Although TU and OU 
are similar in the underlying assumption that threat is more salient when it is not predictable, it is 
not yet known if TU and OU are equally anxiety-provoking and there are no studies to our 
knowledge that have compared both experimentally. Because of uncertainty's potential role in 
the development of anxiety and the lack of clarity regarding what types of uncertainty are most 
anxiety provoking there is a clear need to address this significant gap in the literature.  
The Current Study 
The current study directly compared anxiety elicited by temporal and occurrence 
uncertainty by measuring the magnitude of the startle blink response while participants were 
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under threat of potential shock in four anticipation conditions: 1) TU, or uncertainty as to when a 
potential threat would occur, 2) OU, or uncertainty as to if a potential threat would occur, 3) 
certain (C) threat, or absolute certainty a threat would occur at a given time, and 4) safe (S), in 
which no aversive stimulus occurred. We predicted that startle blink during the anticipation 
period would be significantly potentiated during uncertainty conditions (occurrence and 
temporal) compared to predictable threat and safe conditions, and that startle would be 
significantly larger during the anticipation period for certain threat compared to safe trials 
(Grillon et al., 2004; Grillon et al., 2006; Grillon et al., 2008; Nelson & Shankman, 2011). Based 
on findings from Chin and colleagues (2015) that more certain (75% reinforcement) threat 
elicited larger startle responses compared to less certain (50% reinforcement) threat, we 
predicted that TU would elicit more anticipatory anxiety (e.g., larger startle blinks) than OU. 
However, given the paucity of research on occurrence uncertainty, this was an exploratory 
hypothesis. We also measured relationships between anticipatory anxiety during OU and TU 
with self-reported intolerance of uncertainty.  
 In addition to our primary research question, comparing the anxiogenic effects of TU and 
OU, we also used this study as an opportunity to alter the standard NPU task to isolate the 
anticipation and inter-trial interval (ITI) periods to more precisely separate anticipation of certain 
or uncertain threat from potential carry-over effects. In most studies using the NPU paradigm the 
aversive stimulus is explicitly unpaired from cue stimuli and can occur at any time, whereas 
during predictable threat the aversive stimulus will never occur during the ITI (Grillon, 2002; 
Grillon et al., 2004; Grillon et al., 2008; Nelson & Shankman, 2011; Shankman et al., 2011). The 
task design used in the current study clearly separates anticipation periods from the ITI; the 
aversive stimulus only occurred at the end of an anticipation period and never during an ITI. This 
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allowed us to test anxiety elicited both by anticipation of uncertain threat and whether that 
anxiety carries over into the safe ITI periods in these conditions. Lastly, we also examined 
relations between startle blink response to the four conditions and self-reported intolerance of 
uncertainty. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-one undergraduates from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee completed the 
study for course extra credit and a $15 Amazon gift card. Participants were at least 18 years old, 
proficient in English, and had no visual or hearing impairments (corrected vision was 
acceptable). The final sample consisted of 42 participants (30 female; Mage = 20.8, SDage= 0.71). 
Three participants were dropped due to data collection errors, 3 due to processing errors, and 3 
were classified as non-responders for the startle eyeblink (Bradford, Starr, Shackman, & Curtin, 
2015). Prior to the start of the experiment, participants provided written informed consent. Prior 
to conducting the study, a power analysis was conducted to determine the required sample size. 
Assuming a small to moderate effect size (partial n2 = 0.37) from Nelson and Shankman’s study 
(2011), a power of 0.95 and alpha of 0.05 yielded a required sample size of 28. Therefore, more 
than 50 participants were recruited to account for incomplete data, subject withdrawal, and 
dropped data due to artifact rejection. 
Study Flow  
Prior to the start of the task, participants underwent a shock threshold work-up to 
determine the level of electrical stimulation to be used throughout the task and completed a 
startle habituation procedure. Next, participants completed two runs of four blocks of the certain-
uncertain threat task. Each block contained trials from one condition: Certainty (C); Occurrence 
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Uncertainty (OU); Temporal Uncertainty (TU); or Safe (S). The magnitude of physiological 
defensive responding was used as an index of anxiety and was measured as the magnitude of 
blink responses to acoustic startle probes during the anticipation and ITI periods. At the end of 
each block, participants rated their level of anxiety and discomfort associated with the shocks. 
After finishing the task participants completed a questionnaire assessing intolerance of 
uncertainty. 
Materials and Procedure 
Shock Work-Up. Participants first completed a shock work-up to set the level of 
electrical stimulation (i.e., a shock) at an individually-titrated painful, but tolerable, level. Shocks 
were delivered using Psychlab’s SHK1 Pain Stimulation Shocker (Contact Precision 
Instruments, Cambridge, MA). Participants had two sensors placed approximately two inches 
above their right ankle (using double sided tape and conductive gel), which delivered the electric 
stimulation. Participants were told that they would receive a mild electric shock and would be 
asked to rate it from 1 to 10, 1 being “didn’t feel anything,” and 10 being “painful, but 
tolerable.” The goal was to work up to a level that the participant would subjectively rate as a 
10: “painful, but tolerable.” Once that shock level was established, shock was set at that level for 
the duration of task; the participant could increase or decrease the level at any point in the study 
if they became too uncomfortable. One participant increased their shock level from 100 to 120 
units (1.96mA to 2.35mA) during the break in between runs and their data was included in 
analyses. All other participants maintained their initial shock level.  
Startle Habituation. Once the shock work-up was completed, participants then began a 
startle habituation procedure. Following past research, this process was used to habituate the 
participants to the startle probes to prevent biased (excessively large) startle responses in the first 
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few trials of the task (Blumenthal et al., 2005). Two sensors were applied under the left eye to 
measure the startle eye-blink response. This response was measured while participants were 
presented nine 50ms 102dB white noise startles through Bose noise cancelling headphones. 
There was an 8-12 s ITI between each startle probe. Immediately after startle habituation 
participants began the task.  
Occurrence Uncertainty vs. Temporal Unpredictability Task. To create an 
anticipation period prior to delivery of the electrical stimulation (or lack thereof), participants 
viewed “loading bars” that slowly filled over the course of the anticipation period. These loading 
bars and associated instructions specified whether they will or might be shocked (threat) during 
the trial, at the end of each trial (when the bar was completely full), or not at all. The task was 
blocked by condition, and the start of each trial featured a cue slide explicitly stating which of 
the four conditions the participant was currently completing. The condition cue was replaced by 
a fixation cross after the anticipation period ended. Each trial’s anticipation period consisted of a 
loading bar that filled over the course of up to 10 s. The four conditions measured occurrence 
uncertainty and temporal uncertainty: 1) C, with a shock always occurring at the end of the 
loading bar (10s); 2) TU, with a shock always occurring at a random time between 2s and 10s 
during the loading bar; 3) OU, with 50% chance of a shock occurring at the end of the loading 
bar (10s); and 4) S, with no shocks throughout the loading bar (10s).  
 The task included eight blocks, each of which contained five trials of a single condition, 
for a total of 40 trials, 10 per condition. Similar to the Schmitz & Grillon (2012) NPU task, we 
used two counterbalanced run orders: TU-S-C-OU and OU-C-S-TU. There was a five-minute 
break in between the two runs. Each trial lasted for a maximum of 35 seconds and contained one 
startle probe during the loading bar anticipation period and one during the ITI, which varied 
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between 9s and 24.5s. There were a total of 12 startle probes per condition, six during the bar, 
and six during the ITI, for a total of 48 startle probes overall (Table 1). Each startle probe was 
timed in such a way that there would always be at least 10s between startle probes and at least 
10s following the aversive event (i.e., shock) to avoid the possibility of participants desensitizing 
to the startle probe (Grillon et al., 2008). Additionally, there was one shock delivered in each of 
the TU and C trials, one shock delivered in 50% of the OU trials, and no shocks delivered during 
the S trials, for a maximum of 15 shocks per run and 25 shocks overall (Table 1). 
Eye-blink Startle Collection. Raw startle blink peak amplitudes were the primary 
dependent variable, consistent with previous startle blink investigations (Bradford et al., 2015; 
Grillon et al., 2004; Grillon et al., 2009; Nelson & Shankman, 2011; Nelson, Hajcak, & 
Shankman, 2015). Startle eye-blink data were measured using a BioNomadix® 2Ch EMG 
Receiver (Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA) from two 4-mm Ag/AgCl sensors placed below the left 
eye, over the orbicularis muscle. One sensor was placed 1 cm below the pupil and the other was 
placed 1 cm towards the outer canthi of the left eye. The ground sensor was placed in the center 
of the forehead. Blinks were recorded and processed using Biopac’s Acqknowledge software 
according to guidelines presented by Blumenthal and colleagues (2005). Startle EMG was 
filtered online using a 5-500 Hz bandpass filter and offline using a 28 Hz high-pass filter (4th 
order Butterworth) and a 30 Hz low-pass filter (4th order Butterworth). Peak amplitudes were 
measured in the 20-200 ms time window following the white noise startle probe. Trials were 
rejected if there was greater than a ±40μV deflection in the 50ms baseline period. Blinks were 
visually inspected and were rejected if the startle response did not begin and end within the 20-
200 ms time window. Participants were determined to be non-responders if mean startle 
reactivity was below 5μV (Bradford et al., 2015). 
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Subjective Ratings. At the end of each block, participants completed short subjective 
ratings to gauge their emotions during the task. They were asked to rate on a scale of one to 
seven how anxious they felt during the preceding block of trials and how aversive the electrical 
stimulation felt during that block. These subjective ratings were used as a manipulation check to 
determine if the electrical stimulation was perceived as aversive, consistent with previous 
research using an NPU paradigm (Nelson & Shankman, 2011). 
Assaying Intolerance of Uncertainty. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Buhr & 
Dugas, 2002; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Freeston et al., 1994) was 
used to measure participants’ level of intolerance of uncertain threats, situations, and outcomes. 
Intolerance of uncertainty scores were correlated with startle blink responsivity to better examine 
the relationship between the OU, and TU, and C conditions. The IUS consists of 27 items and 
four factors: 1) uncertainty leads to the inability to act; 2) uncertainty is stressful and upsetting; 
3) unexpected events are negative and should be avoided; 4) being uncertain about the future is 
unfair. The IUS has good test-retest reliability at a five-week interval (r = .74), excellent internal 
consistency (α=0.94), and good internal and external validity with measures of anxiety, 
depression, and worry (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). 
Analysis Plan 
Research Question 1: Replicating past findings, startle blink magnitude during anticipation will 
be greater for uncertain than certain conditions, and greater for certain than safe trials.  
The first research question addressed whether startle blink magnitudes during anticipation 
periods would replicate findings from past literature (Grillon et al., 2004; Grillon et al., 2006; 
Grillon et al., 2008; Nelson & Shankman, 2011). My hypothesis was that startle during the 
anticipation period would be significantly potentiated during uncertain conditions (occurrence 
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and temporal) compared to predictable and safe conditions. I also predicted that startle would be 
significantly larger during the anticipation period for certain threat compared to safe trials. A 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the main effect of condition for 
startle blink magnitudes during the anticipation period. Follow-up Bonferroni corrected 
comparisons were used to examine differences between conditions.  
Research Question 2: Comparison of startle response for TU and OU 
 For the second research question I compared anticipation startle blink magnitudes for TU 
and OU trials. I predicted that the anticipatory startle responses during TU trials would be 
significantly greater than those during OU trials. Using the same one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA described above (TU, OU, C, S), I predicted that there would be a main effect of 
condition. I conducted follow-up comparisons to determine if startle responses during TU were 
greater than those during OU trials. 
Research Question 3: Relationship between startle response and IUS scores 
 The third research question examined the relationship between IUS scores and the 
anticipation startle response during certain and uncertain trials. I predicted that the startle 
response during uncertain trials would be more strongly related to IUS scores than certain 
conditions. Separate correlations were run to examine the OU-IUS and TU-IUS relationships. If 
there had been any significant correlations, I would have run a step-wise linear regression to 
examine the relationship between anticipation startle response during certain and uncertain trials 
and IUS scores. There were no significant correlations so this test was not run. 
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Results 
Eyeblink Startle Magnitude: Anticipation Period 
A within-subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of condition during the 
bar anticipation period. Results revealed a main effect of condition, F(3, 42) = 16.34, p < .0001. 
Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected) indicated that blinks during the TU anticipation 
period were significantly larger than those for the OU, C, and S conditions, ps < .0001 (Figure 
2). Startle blinks were also larger during the OU anticipation period compared to the C, p < .012, 
but not S anticipation periods, p = .44. Startle eyeblink magnitudes did not differ for C and S 
anticipation periods, p > .99.  
Eyeblink Startle Magnitude: Inter-trial Intervals 
An analogous ANOVA was conducted for the ITI period to examine potential anxiety-
related carry-over effects of startle responsivity into the always safe inter-trial interval. There 
was a significant main effect of condition, F(3, 42) = 3.10, p < .05. Post-hoc tests indicated that 
startle magnitudes during the TU block ITIs were nearly, but not quite significantly higher than 
those during C block ITIs, p = .051 (Figure 3; Bonferroni-adjusted). No other conditions were 
different from each other after Bonferroni correction, ps > .20 
Anxiety Induction Manipulation Check 
 A series of repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether the shock 
manipulation did indeed influence self-reported anxiety and pain. For shock-related anxiety there 
was a main effect of condition, F(3, 42) = 67.55, p < .0001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants rated feeling more anxious in the TU and OU conditions than in the C condition, 
which in turn was rated as more anxiety provoking than the S condition, ps < .001 (Figure 4). 
Finally, results indicated a main effect of condition on shock-related pain, F(3, 42) = 152.37, p < 
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.0001. Participants reported significantly less shock-related pain in the S condition compared to 
all threat conditions, ps < .0001 (Figure 5). Again, there were no significant differences among 
the threat conditions, ps  > .18.  
Relations Between Anticipation Period Startle Responding and Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scores  
 A series of pairwise Pearson correlations were run to examine the relationships between 
anticipation startle responsivity during each condition and IUS scores. There were no significant 
correlations between the intolerance of uncertainty and startle responsivity, ps > .83. 
Discussion 
A direct comparison of TU and OU provided evidence for TU’s superiority in eliciting 
anxiety-potentiated startle responsivity in a non-clinical sample. The findings support the robust 
extant literature indicating that uncertainty associated with not knowing when an aversive event 
will occur (TU) is a potent elicitor of anxiety (Grillon et al., 2004; Grillon, 2008; Grillon et al., 
2008; Grillon et al., 2009; Lissek et al., 2005; Nelson & Shankman, 2011; Shankman et al., 
2011). Our results further reinforce the anxiogenic properties of uncertainty more broadly. While 
OU-elicited startle responsivity was less than that for TU, it was significantly larger than the 
anticipation startle responsivity during the certain threat (C) condition. Therefore, OU, an 
understudied type of uncertainty, may still be an important aspect of uncertainty relevant for 
evoking anxiety. Additionally, somewhat unexpectedly we found that anticipatory startle during 
C and S conditions were not different. These findings were not anticipated and should be 
interpreted cautiously. Finally, we did not find strong evidence for carryover of anxiety after the 
end of the anticipation in any condition, nor did we find that startle-blink assessed anticipatory 
anxiety was associated with self-reported intolerance of uncertainty. 
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Disentangling Temporal and Occurrence Uncertainty 
Although OU and TU have not been directly compared previously and OU has received 
relatively little focus, Chin and colleagues (2015) provided evidence for OU’s role in the 
elicitation of anxiety-potentiated startle. They examined frequency as a type of uncertainty in an 
associative learning task of response to uncertainty with two conditions: a more uncertain 50% 
reinforcement condition (similar to our OU condition) and a less uncertain 75% reinforcement 
condition. The 75% reinforcement condition elicited a larger anticipatory startle response than 
the 50% condition. Their results suggest that, having some certainty that a threat will occur, but 
not knowing when, is a stronger potentiator of anxiety than conditions in which there is 
uncertainty about whether the threat will occur. This is consistent with our finding of greater 
blink potentiation in the TU condition, where participants were 100% certain that they would be 
shocked, but they did not know when it would occur. The threat during the OU condition may 
not have been salient enough to elicit a significantly larger startle response when compared to a 
temporally uncertain threat that was more certain. Interestingly, participants’ self-reported 
anxiety at the end of each block indicated that in retrospect it felt equally anxiety-provoking 
anticipating both types of uncertainty, but, the online assessment of anticipatory anxiety showed 
a stronger effect for temporal uncertainty. Overall, our data indicate that although being 
completely certain about if and when a threat will occur is less anxiety-provoking than uncertain 
threat, some certainty that threat will occur enhances anticipatory anxiety in uncertain conditions.  
This suggests that the threatening stimulus may need to be salient or close enough 
temporally or spatially (i.e., more certain) to trigger a more potent anxiety response. Indeed, 
previous literature examining the time course of anticipatory anxiety showed that when the 
startle response is elicited during the threat anticipation period, threat potentiation is not evident 
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until just prior to the onset of the threat; in other words, the anticipatory anxiety dramatically 
increases as the threat becomes more certain to occur. (Grillon, Ameli, Merikangas, Woods, & 
Davis, 1993; Grillon, Ameli, Goddard, Woods, & Davis, 1994). Animal research has also 
supported the assertion that a defensive response pattern is governed by the physical distance of 
the threat, such that anxiety is initially produced in the presence of distal threat, and significantly 
increases as the threat becomes more imminent (Blanchard, Yudko, Rodgers, & Blanchard, 
1993; Bolles & Fanselow, 1980; Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010; Fanselow, 1986). 
Without this threat imminence, merely introducing uncertainty may not substantially increase the 
anxiety-potentiated startle response in non-anxious humans. Overall, it seems that there is a need 
for some degree of certainty (e.g., likelihood, timing, type) about an uncertain threat for the 
anticipatory anxiety to be significantly potent.   
Individual Differences in Intolerance to Uncertainty and Anticipation of Uncertain Threat 
Individual differences in the intolerance of uncertainty may be relevant for the way an 
individual differentially responds to temporal uncertainty and occurrence uncertainty. However, 
the findings thus far are mixed. For example, in the Chin and colleagues (2015) study, 
intolerance of uncertainty was positively correlated with the more uncertain condition (OU), 
rather than the less uncertain condition. Therefore, the more intolerant a person is of uncertainty, 
the stronger their anxiety-potentiated startle response is to uncertainty, regardless of the 
imminence of the threat. However, in our study individual differences in the intolerance of 
uncertainty did not differentially affect how an individual physiologically responded to temporal 
versus occurrence uncertainty. One possible explanation for why intolerance of uncertainty was 
not correlated with anticipation startle responsivity for any of the conditions is that there may not 
have been a large enough sample to capture a broader sufficient range in intolerance of 
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uncertainty scores. However, our sample’s scores ranged from 31 to 96 (M = 63.31, SD = 17.15), 
thus capturing a wide variability in intolerance of uncertainty. Another explanation is that 
intolerance of uncertainty is not associated with startle responsivity in this modified NPU task. 
The short, isolated anticipation periods may not provide enough time for any physiological 
nuances to emerge in the face of occurrence or temporal uncertainty. More research is needed to 
understand how individual differences in self-reported intolerance of uncertainty may influence 
differential anxious anticipation responsivity in the face of different types of uncertainty.  
Carry-over of Anxiety 
In a secondary analysis we did not find much evidence of the carryover effect of threat 
across conditions during the ITI period, when the task was safe. It was the case that startle 
responsivity during the TU condition was nearly significantly larger than that during the C 
condition; however, there were no other significant simple comparisons. Although there may 
have been a small carry-over effect for the TU condition (relative to C), the overall findings 
suggest that our task isolated the ITI period from the anticipation and made it effectively safe. 
Fear-potentiated startle to uncertain threat therefore may only be transiently anxiety provoking 
once the individual either experiences the threat or knows they are in a safe environment, thus 
minimizing the potential for carry-over effects (Grillon et al., 1993; Mobbs et al., 2007; 
Shankman et al., 2011). 
Conclusion 
 The anticipation of uncertain threat is a strong elicitor of acute anxiety. Temporal and 
occurrence uncertainty both elicited greater anticipatory anxiety than certain threat, supporting 
the large body of research that uncertain threat tends to elicit significant anxiety (Bradford et al., 
2014; Grillon et al., 2004; Grillon et al., 2008; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Nelson & Shankman, 
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2011; Nelson et al., 2015; Schmitz & Grillon, 2012; Shankman et al., 2011). Our results suggest 
that although the uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a threatening stimulus is enough to 
elicit anxiety, a temporally unpredictable, but certain-to-occur threat elicits more potent 
anticipatory anxiety. Therefore, threat that is certain to occur may be more relevant for eliciting 
an anxiety-potentiated startle response in the context of uncertainty. For example, prior to a job 
performance review a person would likely experience significant anticipatory anxiety if they 
knew that an aspect of their performance was poor (e.g., interpersonal skills with customers), but 
they did not know when in the review it would be addressed. More research is needed to further 
characterize the aspects of uncertainty that are most relevant for the experience of anxiety. 
Future research should focus on the anticipation period as a means for manipulating the 
expectation about a future stimulus, such as the length of the anticipation period, the time at 
which anxiety is measured (e.g., when the startle probe occurs with respect to the threat), or the 
impact of participant control over the degree of uncertainty of the threat.  
Overall, the findings provide more information about uncertainty’s role in the 
anticipation of threat and gives more support for its potential role in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety (Barlow, 2000; Foa, Zinbarg, & Rothbaum, 1992; Mineka & Kihlstrom, 
1978). These findings also provide insight into how varying aspects of uncertainty may be 
related to anticipatory anxiety, and highlight the particularly potent anxiogenic impact of 
temporal uncertainty.  
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Figure 1. Anticipation Period Loading Bars. 
 
An example of the four task condition anticipation periods while “loading bars” are filling. A.) Certainty 
(C). Participants are shocked when the bar is completely filled (100% purple). B.) Temporal Uncertainty 
(TU). Participants are shocked (100%) but could occur at any time while the bar is filling. C.) Occurrence 
Uncertainty (OU). Participants may or may not be shocked (50% shock rate) when the bar is completely 
filled. D.) Safe (S). Participants will not be shocked at any point during the trial, including the ITI.  
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Figure 2. Startle Blink Magnitudes During the Anticipation Period 
Startle blink magnitudes during the anticipation period (while “loading bars” are filling). From left to 
right: Certain (C), Occurrence Uncertainty (OU), Temporal Uncertainty (TU), and Safe (S). * = p<.05; ** 
= p<.0001.  
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Figure 3. Startle Blink Magnitudes During the ITI Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A bar graph representing Bonferonni-corrected follow-up comparisons after an ANOVA for the startle 
responsivity during the ITI period (i.e., while “loading bars” were not present and it was safe from threat). 
From left to right: Certain (C), Occurrence Uncertainty (OU), Temporal Uncertainty (TU), and Safe (S). + 
= p=.051. 
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Figure 4. Subject Anxiety Ratings 
 
A bar graph representing Bonferonni-corrected follow-up comparisons after an ANOVA for the anxiety 
ratings recorded at the end of each block. From left to right: Certain (C), Occurrence Uncertainty (OU), 
Temporal Uncertainty (TU), and Safe (S). ** = p<.0001. 
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Figure 5. Shock-related Pain Ratings 
 
A bar graph representing Bonferonni-corrected follow-up comparisons after an ANOVA for the shock 
pain ratings recorded at the end of each block. From left to right: Certain (C), Occurrence Uncertainty 
(OU), Temporal Uncertainty (TU), and Safe (S). ** = p<.0001. 
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Table 1. Task Conditions 
Condition Bar Length Trials Shocks Startles 
Certainty (C) 10s 10 10 12 
Temporal Uncertainty (TU) 2s-10s 10 10 12 
Occurrence Uncertainty (OU) 10s 10 5 12 
Safe (S) 10s 10 0 12 
Total  40 25 48 
 
The four task conditions and number of trials, shocks, and startle probes are listed: C: certain shock, 
certain time; TU: certain shock, uncertain time; OU: uncertain shock, certain time; and S: no shock (safe).  
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